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Abstract 
 
 
Using retrospective data analysis, this paper looks at the potential effects that the EU 
financial transaction tax would have on registered Austrian funds. We use original data 
for 927 investment funds over a 12-month trading period covering the 2014 calendar 
year. We analyse its effect on total net assets and on performance. We find that the cost 
of FTT on Austrian funds for 2014 would be € 89.5 million. The effect of FTT differs 
between funds and is influenced by fund category, gilt-edged securities held, risk and 
investment strategy. Behavioural changes in the market would likely arise in these areas 
if FTT were to be introduced. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Over the last century, the debate on the use of transaction taxes has been a recurring issue. 
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, John Keynes (1936) suggested for the first time 
the use of transaction taxes to curb market speculation. Later, Nobel Prize laureate James 
Tobin (1972), in the context of the international monetary crisis of 1971 (Johnson, 1973), 
proposed a transaction tax on currency spot transactions in order to curb speculative trading 
in currency exchanges after the end of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971. The recent 
financial crisis has again led to an emphasis on transaction taxes as a means to discourage 
speculative trading. 
 
Currently, the political debate within the European Union focuses on whether or not to 
                                                 
*
 Department of Finance, Accounting and Statistics, Vienna University of Economics and Business 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2613880 
introduce a financial transaction tax (FTT). The outcome of this debate is still uncertain. In 
2013, Member States did not agree on a harmonized approach to financial transaction 
taxation. The Commission proposed a compromise and published a draft directive for 
enhanced cooperation amongst Member States (Proposal for a Council Directive 
Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, COM(2013) 
71 final) (the Proposal). Eleven Member States are presently signatories to the Proposal.1 
 
The general idea is that taxing transactions in financial instruments introduces an additional 
trading cost to the seller or the buyer which might decrease the trading volume and trading 
frequency. The reduction of trading frequency, especially with respect to algorithm-based 
high-frequency trading, in turn stabilizes the (financial) market. 
 
The Proposal sets out three anticipated results. First, it seeks to avoid fragmentation in the 
internal market for financial services. Second, it seeks to ensure that financial institutions 
make a fair and substantial contribution to covering the costs of the recent crisis. Third, it 
aims at creating appropriate disincentives for transactions which do not enhance welfare or 
the efficiency of financial markets (COM(2013) 71 final, explanatory memorandum, ch. 1.2., 
p. 4). This helps support regulatory measures aimed at avoiding future crises. However, these 
objectives are highly criticized from a legal (Englisch, Vella & Yevgenyeva, 2013), 
economic (Oxera, 2011; London Economics, 2013) and social perspective (Oxfam 
International, 2013). 
 
As FTT aims at increasing transaction costs, the question arises as to how the net yield from 
financial investments will be affected, in particular when FTT cascades on purchases and 
sales, without the right for input deductions, or in a series of transactions. Costs and tax 
burdens will likely be passed on to clients of financial institutions (SEC(2011) 1102 final, 
vol. 1: 54), it can be reasonably assumed that financial institutions will shift the costs of this 
new tax (Davis, Smith, Wagner & O’Kelly, n.d.; Mirrlees et al., 2011). This contradicts a 
primary objective of the Proposal, which seeks to ensure that financial institutions pay their 
‘fair share’. The Commission itself notes that a ‘large part of the burden would fall on direct 
and indirect owners of traded financial instruments’ (SEC(2011) 1102 final, vol. 1: 53). 
                                                 
1
  Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
 Several investment funds operating within Europe argue that a FTT will significantly affect 
long-term returns of investors (Black Rock, 2011; Oxera, 2011; AIMA Report, 2012; 
European Fund and Asset Management Association, 2013; Davis et al., n.d.). The 
Commission Services (n.d.: 3) discussed the impact that FTT could have on financial 
institutions, noting that the impact will depend on both the asset allocation (portfolio) and the 
investment strategy (SWD (2013) 28 final). 
 
This paper analyses the effects of a potential FTT as designed in the proposed Directive, 
based on monthly returns of 927 Austrian investment funds. The Austrian fund sector has 
increased substantially over the past two decades. Supported by strong credit ratings by 
international bodies and a stable political environment, the total net assets of mutual funds 
have increased 192% since 1998, while for the same period total assets of Austrian pension 
funds have increased 307% (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, n.d.). The important position that 
Austrian funds have developed is reflected also in the high value of total net assets held by 
the funds analysed within our data. As the Austrian fund sector is now well established, we 
assume that our conclusions are not only Austria-specific, but that they are relevant for funds 
across Europe. For 2014, closing monthly total net assets for all funds in our data set was  
€ 67 billion. 
 
We focus on two research questions: First, how large is the effect of the proposed FTT on 
investment funds, in particular on their performance and their total net assets? Second, which 
types of investment funds2 are particularly affected? FTT seeks to be neutral, but differing 
fund types; the number of transactions within a chain of transfer of instruments; and different 
investment strategies and risk profiles cause FTT to affect funds in different ways. 
 
We use confidential, anonymised, disaggregated data of investment funds that have been 
provided by the Austrian Kontrollbank (Oesterreichische Kontrollbank, OeKB)3 and the 
Association of Austrian Investment Companies (Vereinigung Österreichischer 
                                                 
2
  Data provided included a total of 21 different categories of funds. This included investments in socially 
responsible funds, gilt-edged securities, real estate funds and asset- and mortgage-based funds. 
3
  The Austrian Kontrollbank (Oesterreichische Kontrollbank Aktiengesellschaft, OeKB) is Austria's 
main provider of financial and information services to the export industry and the capital market.  
Investmentgesellschaften, VÖIG),4 with the consent of each investment fund. The data are 
unique and cover specific investment funds operating in Austria during the 12-month period 
from January to December 2014.5 Key information provided includes gross sales and 
purchases of derivative and non-derivative financial instruments, on which we apply the FTT 
rates as suggested in the Proposal. In contrasting the actual returns of funds with the 
hypothetical returns after FTT, we measure the effect of the FTT as the tax wedge. 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional 
background of the Proposal, while section 3 outlines related literature and our hypothesis. 
Data and methodology are outlined in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 
offers conclusions. 
 
2 Institutional Background 
 
As unanimity amongst Member States has not been achieved, the FTT Proposal of February 
2013 encourages enhanced cooperation amongst participating Member States. Though not yet 
adopted, the Proposal suggested implementation of the Directive by participating Member 
States by no later than December 2016 (Joint Statement, 2014). The Proposal is wide in scope 
(Article 3(1), COM(2013) 71 final), with only limited exemptions (Article 3(2) & Article 
3(4), COM(2013) 71 final). This is reflected in the “all markets, all actors, all products” 
approach that the Proposal takes.6 As such, the Commission seeks to minimize circumvention 
by reducing the possibility of both instrument and market substitution. Financial institutions 
are the primary focus of the Proposal (Article 3(1), COM(2013) 71 final), as “they execute 
the bulk of the transactions on financial markets” (Exploratory Memorandum to COM(2011) 
594 final) and are liable for payment of FTT (Article 10, COM(2013) 71 final). 
 
The proposed FTT rate distinguishes between derivatives and other instruments. For 
                                                 
4
  The Association of Austrian Investment Companies is an umbrella organization for all Austrian 
investment fund management companies and all Austrian real estate investment fund management companies. 
5
  Data represent 100% of all Austrian funds held domestically. 
6
  This includes “all markets (regulated and over-the-counter), all actors (from traditional banks via the 
so-called shadow-banking sector to non-financial companies that undertake significant financial transactions) 
and all products (from shares and bonds to derivatives and structured products)” European Commission (n.d.), 
p.3. 
derivatives the rate is 0.01% of the gross value of each transaction, before netting and 
settlement (Article 9(2), COM(2013) 71 final). FTT is therefore similar to other indirect taxes 
that ignore profitability. In all other cases the rate amounts to 0.1% (Article 9(2), COM(2013) 
71 final). Financial transactions covered by the Proposal include (i) the purchase and sale of 
instruments, (ii) transfers between group entities where the right to dispose of as owner and 
the transfer of the risk is associated, (iii) the conclusion of derivatives contracts (iv) 
exchanges of financial instruments and (v) repurchase agreements (Article 2(2), COM(2013) 
71 final). 
 
Financial instruments subject to FTT are defined by reference to section C of Annex I to 
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial 
instruments, and includes structured products (Article 2(3), COM(2013) 71 final). This 
includes transferable securities, money-market instruments, units in collective investment 
undertakings, options, futures, swaps, forward rate agreements and any other derivative 
contracts. Derivatives contracts are defined in subsections (4) to (10) of section C of Annex I 
to Directive 2004/39/EC, as implemented by articles 38 and 39 of Commission Regulation 
(EC) No. 1287/20067 (Article 2(4), COM(2013) 71 final). 
 
FTT is charged on each leg of a transaction, i.e. at the seller and at the buyer, including all 
intermediaries. In a series of transactions, FTT is levied multiple times, on gross values 
without deductions. Figure 1 below illustrates the FTT implications of a simple transaction 
(Davis et al., n.d.) and illustrates the substantial cascading effect that could arise from the 
introduction of FTT. In this case, one transaction between two asset managers involves five 
further intermediaries, and FTT is levied 10 times.7 
 
Figure 1: Example – Trade Chain in Cash Equities Markets and FTT Implications8 
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  As gross values increase along the value chain, the ultimate cascading effect may be very significant. 
8
  Davis et al. (n.d) figure 13, p. 19 (all figures bps (basis points)). 
Under the assumption that each seller in the chain will shift the FTT burden to the next buyer, 
all FTT accumulates at the end of that chain, i.e. Asset Manager 2. For them, the accumulated 
FTT is a transaction cost, which – in case of an investment fund – will ultimately reduce the 
performance of the fund at the expense of the fund shareholder. The worst-case scenario of 
10 times FTT from effectively one transaction involving a chain of intermediaries, is 
reflected in the literature (AIMA, 2012; Clifford Chance, 2013). 
 
3 Related Literature and Hypothesis 
 
Transaction taxes are found in a number of jurisdictions. They differ across the globe in 
scope, rate and means of implementation. The United Kingdom has one of the oldest 
examples of transaction taxes in Europe, whilst Sweden implemented transaction taxes in 
1986, and recently both France (2012) and Italy (2013) have been inspired by the 
Commission to implement transaction taxes of their own. 
 
Empirical research based on market observations provides an important insight into how 
markets could react to the introduction of FTT, specifically on the effect of transaction taxes 
on market behaviour. Tobin saw transaction taxes as a way to reduce speculative trading in 
the currency market (Tobin, 1978). Speculation destabilizes markets as it shifts the focus 
away from fundamental values (Tobin, 1978). Indirect trading taxes burden trades and 
discourages speculation, as it taxes both positive and negative outcomes. Derivatives have a 
shorter time horizon and will be affected the most by FTT (Schulmeister, Schratzenstaller & 
Picek, 2008). 
 
Transaction taxes reduce trading volumes both upon announcement (Bond, Hawkins & 
Klemm, 2005) and upon implementation (Umlauf, 1993; Pomeranets & Weaver, 2011). A 
change to market volumes negatively affects market liquidity unless market makers are able 
to sufficiently compensate for the introduction of transaction taxes (Pellizzari & Westerhoff, 
2009). There is a strong link between variance and volume, and while risk is positively 
correlated to volume, risk decreases with time (Jorion, 1996). 
 
Research, however, has not been consistent on the effect of transaction taxes on volatility 
(Umlauf, 1993; Jones & Seguin, 1997; Bond, Hawkins & Klemm, 2005; Baltagi, Li & Li, 
2006; Pomeranets & Weaver, 2011). The introduction of transaction taxes aims to reduce 
market volatility, but it has been found to increase, decrease and have a neutral effect. This is 
counterintuitive to the objectives of FTT. Furthermore, the complexity of investment styles 
makes forecasting the impact of regulatory reform difficult (Lensberg, Schenk-Hoppé & 
Ladley, 2015). 
 
Relocation to avoid transaction taxes will arise, but bias towards home equity (Amadia & 
Bergin, 2008) would help to counter balance this. The introduction of transaction taxes 
significantly reduces stock turnover (Becchettia et al., 2014). Market volatility increases with 
turnover, and those stocks with a higher beta-value contribute the most to excess volatility 
(Kasch, 2015). 
 
In the case of technical analysis, stylized facts indicate that transaction taxes do not eliminate 
profit (Menkhoff & Taylor, 2007). The cost of transaction taxes will be marginal for 
investors if performance can outweigh transaction costs. As for performance, the flow-
performance relationship of funds is convex (Siri & Tufano, 1998; Del Guercio & Tkac, 
2002). This will mean that past fund performance will affect future FTT costs, as high 
performing funds will encourage more investors. The more convex the flow-performance 
relationship, the more risk managers will take (Ferreira et al., 2012). But as the incidence of 
the tax affects performance, this will be reflected in asset prices. Transaction taxes are shown 
to consistently reduce asset prices across the board (Schwert & Seguin, 1993; Kupiecs, 1996; 
Habermeier & Kirilenko, 2003; Matheson, 2011; Brondolo, 2012). 
 
Differences in performance between active and passive strategies have been noted (Huntera 
et al., 2014), with active portfolio strategies attracting higher costs (French, 2008). Active 
portfolio strategies should provide greater returns to investors, but this has not always been 
the case (Tudoraa, 2012). A significant short- and long-term implication of transaction taxes 
is their impact on investor returns. Diversification can help to improve overall returns. 
However, as costs increase with the introduction of transaction taxes, this may encourage 
more passive holdings (Rowland, 1998; Lensberg, Schenk-Hoppé & Ladley, 2015) which 
may negatively affect diversification. 
 
The increase in market trading has shown that there has been a shift in focus from 
fundamental trading to technical trading (also known as chartist analysis). The use of 
technical analysis over fundamental analysis is inversely related to time horizons (Menkhoff 
& Taylor, 2007). If increasing costs discourage short-term trading, transaction taxes may shift 
investment analysis back to fundamental analysis. 
 
The European Commission has not quantified the potential loss of value for different 
category of investors. However, in accordance with the objectives of the Proposal, the 
Commission recognizes that market behaviour will change and that higher costs will affect 
profit margins. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the effect of an FTT on investor returns – although plausible 
and frequently stated – has not yet been subjected to academic research. The claim that FTT 
should reduce speculative trading by the industry and lead to financial institutions paying 
their “fair share”, is in obvious contrast to the notion of financial institutions passing the 
burden on to clients. Not all services and transactions can be located outside the FTT zone. 
For customers, the burden might become material, in particular when multiple layers of a 
transaction chain are taxed and the tax burden cumulates at the level of the final customer9 
(Davis et al., n.d.). However, no data are available to estimate the extent of shifting in 
financial markets. 
 
Private fund companies have carried out some estimations on the effect of FTT, based on 
aggregate data. A study by Oliver Wyman concludes that lower returns clearly affect long-
term savings as “rational investors ‘price in’ the future cost of the FTT into perpetuity” 
(Davis et al., n.d.: 27). The Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) notes 
that FTT would affect mostly EU private individuals and pensioners. It adds that, on a 
passive investment in the S&P500 index, if one were to earn an average return of 2%, it 
would take 18 days in order to recoup an FTT charge of 0.1% (AIMA, 2012: 9). This would 
cover the estimated additional effective FTT rate of 2.2%. This would encourage longer-term 
investments, but would reduce turnover and market liquidity. 
 
Results from retrospective analysis of fixed income and equity portfolios performed by Black 
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  “These end-users represent a wide range of ‘real-economy’ participants, including corporations, 
governments and long-term investors (pension funds, asset managers and life insurers)”. It also includes “retail 
investors (via direct investment schemes, as well as participation in collective investment schemes, and as 
beneficiaries of institutional plans”. Davis et al. (n.d.), p. 13. 
Rock show that FTT could reduce returns by up to 257 basis points (bps), with the spread 
dependent on the proportion of equity investments to total investments held within an 
investment portfolio (Black Rock, 2011). However, as a private investment fund, their data 
are not publically available for review. Oxera (2011) uses three illustrations to highlight the 
effect of FTT on returns.10 Other institutions such as the International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA) and the European Repo Council (ERC) support these views. 
 
Based on this evidence from the industry itself, we will shed further light on the effect of 
FTT on investment fund returns. In contrast to industry studies – some of which have the 
character of anecdotal evidence, while others serve lobbying purposes – we use unique 
disaggregate data which allow us to simulate FTT and estimate its effects on a detailed level. 
 
As a first step, our goal is to determine the relative effect of FTT on investment fund total net 
assets and consequently on investment fund performance. Both are measured by change in 
total net assets during the period for each fund. In a second step, we analyse which fund 
characteristics affect the relative amount of FTT. We focus on two specific characteristics, 
namely the funds risk and the investment strategy. 
 
According to the political claim, as discussed above, FTT increases transaction costs for 
buyers and sellers of financial instruments, and reduces the number and volume of 
transactions. Investors are assumed to seek to accommodate additional transaction cost by 
reducing the volume and the frequency of trading as a first step to avoid the tax. Empirical 
results do show that trading volumes fall when transaction taxes are introduced (see above). 
 
Investors expect high returns from high-risk investments (Dey, 2005). Expected returns net of 
trading costs increase with the holding period, and are therefore inversely related to turnover 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). Transaction taxes encourage long-term holdings to dampen 
costs (Matheson, 2011). Others suggest that the positive relation between returns and 
turnover reflect active management that leads to a high turnover (Dey, 2005, quoting various 
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  Oxera, 2011: (i) a typical 40-year pension fund would suffer both a loss in returns and retirement value 
and potentially lose 2.7% to 5.5% of its final value; (ii) a retail investment earning an expected return of 5% 
could potentially lose 0.8% of its returns due to financial institutions’ shifting the burden to investors and due to 
the cascading effect of FTT; and (iii) a typical manufacturing firm could suffer a 0.74% reduction in profits on a 
10% margin on derivatives due to higher derivative costs. 
authors). Active investors may be affected more by transaction taxes than those undertaking 
passive investment strategies, which may have a longer investment horizon. Their 
participation in the market would reflect this. Overall market turnover increases with the 
number of active investors (Tauchen & Pitts, 1983). The objective of the Proposal is to 
encourage stability. If trading volumes are positively related to investment betas (risk) (Ciner, 
2015), then lower volumes would suggest a more stable market. Thus, FTT could help to 
limit market instability (Carfi & Musolino, 2014). 
 
We should find that investments with higher risk are subject to higher tax costs. Further, if 
FTT is to discourage speculative trading, then funds which are managed actively should be 
affected more than passively managed funds. Our hypothesis therefore read: 
H1: The reduction of performance by FTT is higher for funds with a riskier portfolio. 
H2: The reduction of performance by FTT is higher for funds with an active 
management style. 
 
4 Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
 
We use data from Austrian investment funds. Austrian funds are regulated by law, including 
the implementation of, among others, Directive 2014/91/EU, which covers undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS). The investment funds are subject to 
supervision by the Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium für Finanzen, BMF), the 
National Bank of Austria (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, OeNB) and the Financial Market 
Authority (Österreichische Finanzmarktaufsicht, FMA). 
 
All Austrian funds are required to report transactions to the National Bank of Austria. The 
National Bank acts as an intermediary data collector for the Austrian National Bank, 
providing the necessary IT platform for the submission of timely data. The National Bank, in 
cooperation with the Association of Austrian Investment Funds (Vereinigung 
Österreichischer Investmentgesellschaften, VÖIG) provided us with access to these 
disaggregate data, ensuring that all requirements of confidentiality and anonymity are met. 
 
Data exclude real estate funds,11 where FTT – by its nature – will have only little effect, and 
alternative investment funds, as the respective law was implemented in Austria during our 
observation period, in mid-2014. Fund of funds are excluded, as they do not add insight, but 
rather merely an additional institutional layer. We also exclude special funds (Spezialfonds): 
they are not available on the market, they serve specific purposes and they are subject to 
specific rules and limitations. Hedge funds are also excluded from our data. Our data also 
exclude repos, as Austrian funds have no regulatory obligation to report such transactions. 
 
The information provided by the OeKB comprises end of month time series data of 927 funds 
covering the 12-month period from January to December 2014. Data are available per fund 
and per month, and in total comprise 10,393 observations.12 Our data include monthly totals 
for all purchases and sales in euro, without netting, separately for bonds, index securities, 
fund investments, equity shares and derivative products. Data on derivatives are provided on 
a positive or negative net trade basis.13 Further, end of month closing total net assets are 
provided in euro, and monthly performance as percentages. Additional fund characteristics 
are provided for each observation, which may vary per month, also within one specific 
investment fund.14 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the sample data. We exclude observations with total net 
assets (TNA) per month-end of zero and with observations with zero performance, which is 
reported as “n/a”. We maintain observations with a monthly performance of zero or virtually 
zero;15 however subsequent calculations on the tax effect are shown as “missing value” to 
avoid error terms or outliers, which distort results. 
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
                                                 
11
  I.e. all funds that fall under the real estate funds regime and all funds with more than 20% of their total 
net assets invested in real estate 
12
  Not all funds had data available for a full 12 months. This may be due to either funds commencing 
trading later in the year or ceasing trading before year end. 
13
  For our data analysis, we convert all negative values to positives. Derivative values are both negative 
and positive, with negative values reflecting a net payment obligation. 
14
  Our data include a mix of investments periods, including investments held for short- (0-3 years), 
medium- (3-7years) and long-term periods (more than 7 years). 
15
  Performance < 0.00001; 3 observations. 
Table 2 outlines descriptive statistics for total purchases and sales. 
 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
4.2 Variables 
 
Our variables measure the hypothetical effect of an FTT on a fund’s performance. They result 
from simulation. Hypothetical FTT in euro is calculated for each observation, i.e. per 
fund/month, based on total purchases and sales in euro that occurred during the month, 
applying the provisions of the proposed FTT directive. The calculation, in a first step, 
excludes cascading effects. If FTT were to arise only once in a transaction, it would amount 
to (in euro): 
0.001 x [purchases (bonds, index papers, funds shares, equity shares) + 
sales (bonds, index papers, funds shares, equity shares)] + 0.0001 x 
[purchases (derivatives) + sales (derivatives)] 
 
The FTT that we calculate is underestimated in one regard: the data on purchases and sales of 
derivatives in euro relate to amounts that are transacted, whereas FTT is really levied on the 
notional value of the underlying, which is normally considerably higher than the value that is 
registered on exchanges. Unfortunately, our data do not give information on notional values. 
 
To simulate the performance after hypothetical FTT, we reduce the monthly performance 
before FTT by FTT per month related to the month-end TNA. As the performance depends 
on valuations of assets (total net assets, TNA) held by a fund at the end of a period, it 
therefore depends on realized and unrealized changes in market values, as well as on 
dividend and interest income. TNA values are published on a daily basis, and include any re-
invested dividends. They are based on the value of total net assets and daily fund price plus 
any dividend per share. Transaction costs and administrative costs reduce performance, as 
would FTT. The performance is corrected for fund share splits and for the distributing/non-
distributing character of the fund. 
 
The variable TWPER1 denotes the tax wedge in performance (PER), i.e. the relative 
reduction of performance after the deduction of FTT:16 
1 =
 − 	



 
 
The effect of FTT on the TNA is calculated similarly: 
 =
 − 	



 
 
Further, we include categorical variables to explain the differences in the effect of FTT, 
depending on different attributes. 
 
We also consider the impact of cascading. Based on a worst-case scenario as discussed in the 
literature, we consider that the above variables based on 10pbs17 FTT cost, i.e. the effect of 
FTT would reflect a chain of transactions from start to finish that multiples FTT by 10 (see 
Figure 1). 
 
To analyse the effect of the riskiness of the fund on its FTT-exposure, we use three variables: 
fund category (CAT, CATGRP), gilt-edged (GE) and bond risk category (RISK), as follows. 
 
CAT: The fund category ranges between five broad groups: bond funds, money market funds, 
equity funds, derivative funds and mixed funds. The classification as bond funds or equity 
funds requires that the majority of the portfolio (51%) be held in bonds or equity, 
respectively. Money market funds are regulated according to CESR/10-049.18 Mixed funds 
are based on non-bond exposure and ignore the derivative position of the fund. Further, a 
distinction according to duration is drawn. 
                                                 
16
  An alternative measure of the effect of FTT on performance measures the reduction in percentage 
points.  As the results in our subsequent descriptive and statistical analysis are the same, we therefore display 
only results for TWPER1. 
17
  percentage basis points. 
18
  Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) guidelines on a Common Definition of 
European Money Market Funds, CESR/10-049. The CESR’s guidelines set out a two-tiered approach for a 
definition of European money market funds, namely (i) short-term money market funds and (ii) money market 
funds. “This approach recognises the distinction between short-term money market funds, which operate a very 
short weighted average maturity and weighted average life, and money market funds which operate with a 
longer weighted average maturity and weighted average life”. CESR, p. 1. 
 CATGRP: We group above CAT variables based on type, by dropping the distinction 
according to duration. This includes equity, derivatives, mixed, money market and bonds. 
 
GE: Highly conservative funds which are adequate, under Austrian law, for the investment to 
the benefit of wards (e.g. children who lack legal right capacity), are classified as gilt-edged. 
As only 3% of funds were observed to be gilt-edged, our data are binary (yes/no). 
 
RISK: Bonds account for 67% of all purchases and 66% of all sales. As only bond funds, 
mixed funds and money market funds give information on their risk in bonds, the data 
accordingly show a high percentage of n/a. Our data include triple-A, investment grade and 
non-investment grade bonds. Classification of funds between different groups is based on a 
weighted average of bond data, with minimum thresholds for classification set at 51%. 
Classifications represent the quality of investments. Investments in AAA bonds have high 
credit worthiness. Investment grade bonds are the next tier of credit worthiness and have a 
BBB rating. They are ranked higher in terms of credit worthiness to non-investment grade 
bonds that have a BB ranking. The latter is the lowest rank for bonds in our sample and 
carries a higher risk of default for investors. 
 
RR: We group GE and RISK as risk variables by classification. Funds classified as 
categorical variable GE, are grouped with funds that are classified under RISK variables 
having a classification of MINAA, INGR or NINGR. Those having no classification as GE 
funds are then classified separately under each categorical variable of RISK, MINAA, INGR 
and NINGR, respectively. We thus construct an ordinal variable which considers GE-funds 
as the least risky, followed by non-GE MINAA, INGR and NINGR as the most risky, in that 
order (i.e. ranking from 1 to 4). The variable RR is applicable only for money market funds, 
bond funds and mixed funds. 
 
The investment strategy of the fund can be found in two variables, namely active investment 
strategy and passive investment strategy. 
 
ACT: The fund’s management actively looks for market inefficiencies and invests 
accordingly. The manager therefore actively decides on timing of investment and on specific 
stocks, bonds or other instruments. As an active investment strategy is available only for 
equity funds or mixed funds, therefore, again, we find a large number of n/a. Data provided 
differentiate between growth style, value style and blend style of management. 
 
PASS: A fund’s portfolio normally mirrors components of a market index, and automatically 
reflects any changes in the underlying index (for example market capitalization, based on the 
assumption that an individual investor cannot outsmart the market). The data are binary 
(yes/no). 
 
MGST: We group ACT- and PASS-style management and construct an additional variable on 
management style. As some funds are classified as neither active or passive (that data entry is 
not mandatory), we leave them unclassified. 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of our categorical variables. Table 4 groups our 
descriptive statistics by CAT, RR and MGST. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics only for 
bonds found within CAT. 
 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
 
5 Results 
5.1 Tax Wedge: The Absolute and Relative Effect of FTT on Performance and TNA 
 
In our analysis, we differentiate between a best-case and a worst-case scenario. In the best-
case scenario, FTT is levied exactly once upon each transaction. Not even the second leg of 
the transaction (the counterparty’s FTT) is included in the simulation. In the worst-case 
scenario, we assume that each transaction is the result of a chain of sub-transactions with the 
incidence of FTT being 10 times, due to the cascading effect, as described above. Both 
scenarios are equally unrealistic: FTT will neither be levied once, nor will it arise 10 times 
for each single transaction; the two scenarios merely determine the lower and upper 
boundaries of the FTT burden. Based on our above thoughts, we assume that in both 
scenarios, the investor ultimately bears the burden of FTT. 
 In the best-case scenario, we find that the total cost of FTT is € 89.5 million based on tax 
rates provided by the Proposal multiplied by sales and purchase values. This would represent 
0.062% of tax revenue generated in Austria in 2014, which amounted to €143.7 billion 
(Statistics Austria). In that scenario, FTT would reduce performance at a median of 0.7% 
(average 8.12%; TWPER1) (see Table 6).19 The effect on the total net assets is small, as one 
would expect: the median tax wedge would be 0.00006% (average 0.014%) of TNA. 
 
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
 
It is obvious that these results considerably underestimate the effects of FTT. There are a 
number of reasons for this. On the one hand, we cannot take into consideration the notional 
values of derivative transactions or the potential influence of factoring on derivatives, due to 
lack of data, both of which may significantly increase the tax base for FTT for such 
instruments. The best-case scenario also excludes the cascading effect of the tax. 
 
For the worst-case scenario (Table 7), where we assume that a typical transaction may 
involve 10 instances of FTT liability, one can easily multiply the results from Table 6 by 
10.20 The median effect of FTT would then be a 7% reduction in fund performance, and even 
as high as 80% on average. 
 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
 
5.2 Differences in medians between groups 
5.2.1 Graphical illustration 
 
Graphs 1 and 2 show the difference in medians of our categorical variables. Results for fund 
                                                 
19
  If the reduction were measured in percentage points, the fund performance before FTT would decrease 
from 0.525% to 0.511% due to a reduction on average of 0.014 ppt (TWPER2) (median of TWPER2 = 0.006 
ppt).  
20
  We assume a cumulative relation between the 10 FTT-instances; there is no indication that an 
exponential relation would apply. As transaction taxes have been found to reduce asset prices, we do not 
account for taxes on taxes. 
category show that FTT affects money market funds the most. Investments which are not 
classified as gilt-edged securities are also affected more than those which are classified as 
gilt-edged. We also find that investments which have neither active nor passive style 
management are affected more by FTT than those that do have a declared (active or passive) 
management style. 
 
<Insert Graphs 1 and 2 about here> 
 
Graphs 3 and 4 show the results from grouping our data. Our results again show that money 
market funds and funds with no management style classification are the most affected by 
FTT. As reference to management style is not a mandatory field, details are not always 
provided by funds. 
 
<Insert Graphs 3 and 4 about here> 
 
We further analyse our data by removing money market funds (which clearly dominate) from 
fund category (CAT), and compare the duration of bond fund investments. The removal of 
money market funds from our data clarifies the impact of FTT on other fund categories. 
 
The results for bond fund classification clearly show that FTT will have the greatest impact 
on short-term bond funds. This is in line with the objectives of FTT to encourage longer-term 
holdings, as short-term trades increase the cost of FTT on a fund. Graphs 5 and 6 show our 
results. 
 
<Insert Graphs 5 and 6 about here> 
 
5.2.2 Non-Parametric Testing 
 
The quality of the data requires non-parametric testing, as our data do not have a normal 
distribution. We use the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney U) test and Kruskal-Wallis test 
to compare medians between groups that result from our categorical variables. We thus test 
whether the difference in medians of FTT effects (TWTNA, TWPER1, TWPER2) is 
significant between the different groups per categorical variable (CAT, GE, RISK, ACT, 
PASS). 
 
Our results are summarized in Table 8 for the best-case scenario, and in Table 9 for the 
worst-case scenario, including cascading. 
 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
 
We also group data to highlight our results and test for significance. We group GE and RISK 
as one variable, RR. We group ACT and PASS as one variable, MGST. We also find that the 
results for TWPER1 and TWPER2 are similar. 
 
Our results for the best- and worst-case scenarios for grouped data are summarized in Table 
10 and Table 11, respectively. 
 
<Insert Table 10 about here> 
<Insert Table 11 about here> 
 
Our results show that both RR and MGST affect the FTT tax wedge. We find that return does 
not increase uniformly with risk. Our results do show that actively traded funds are affected 
more by the introduction of FTT than passively managed funds. This is significant, given the 
additional costs charged to investors for actively managed funds. 
 
We can therefore confirm both of our hypotheses, according to which the effect of FTT on 
performance and total net assets depends on risk and investment strategy. The results are 
significant on a 0.01% level. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The understanding of FTT is largely based on estimations of how markets will react based on 
a number of assumptions. This paper analyses the effects of FTT on funds using Austrian 
data for the 2014 calendar year as provided by the OeKB. Austria is a keen supporter of the 
introduction of FTT. Although, at first glance, we might estimate that the effect of FTT on 
Austrian funds may be marginal, cascading can lead to a reduction of fund performance of up 
to 80% on average. The gradual growth of the Austrian fund sector over recent years should 
be considered within the context of the limited adoption of FTT at the European level. 
Furthermore, the cascading effect may vary between these boundaries depending on the 
number of intermediaries in a transaction. 
 
The results highlight that behavioural changes may arise more specifically in certain 
categories of funds. This may infringe portfolio diversification. However, underlying these 
observations is confirmation that data do support that the objective of FTT will be meet. 
Active strategies may require reassessment. Bonds which have a short-term trading duration 
will be affected more. 
 
We must also take into perspective the quantum of FTT paid in relation to the overall value 
of funds traded. After initial market shock, the marginal increase in costs may not be overly 
significant to investors, but would nonetheless affect investment strategies. 
 
Our results are limited to some extent. We cannot induce the indirect effects of FTT (such as 
relocation and the decision not to trade at all), nor the potential decision by market 
participants to increase the holding periods of investments. 
 
Our analysis could be further developed in a number of ways. Further research could 
highlight specific trades, such as the role that intermediaries play within the financial markets 
of Austria. This could support the current debate to extend the scope of exemptions to 
intermediaries in order to reduce the effect of cascading on financial markets. 
  
Table 1: Sample Description 
 
 No. of 
observation
s 
No of 
funds* 
Total net assets 
(TNA) 
Total purchase value Total sales value 
Non-derivatives Derivatives Non-derivatives Derivatives 
  € € € € € 
Initial sample 10,393 927 759,603,566,061 44,776,327,386 572,722,330 45,324,792,042 853,220,741 
Observations containing zero 
TNA 
34 34 0 14,774,872 260,735 656,788,889 286,032 
Observations containing marginal 
TNA** 
1 1 501,0000 0 10,296 1,614,613 32,590 
Observations containing errors in 
monthly performance 
3 3 112,382,340 7,926,173 0 7,969,595 36,150 
Final sample 10,355 927 759,491,164,223 44,753,626,341 572,451,299 44,658,418,945 852,865,969 
Notes: *When referring to data removed from the sample, any reference made to number of funds reflects only the number of unique fund observed with zero 
TNA or zero monthly performance. This seeks only to give an indication of the characteristic of such values, but does not indicate that other observations of 
that particular fund were removed. 
**Return 97% 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Category Mean   Std. deviation Minimum  Q1 Median Q3 Maximum 
TNA 73,345,356 116,795,306 280,536 10,684,612 30,011,699 77,273,788 872,331,333 
PER 0.52543 1.8895 -18.21109 -0.05548 0.39073 1.18470 17.18305 
FTT 8,648 21,214 0.00 292 1,753 7,014 350,471 
Bond 
 Purchase 2,916,646 10,356,309  0 0 0 1,314,269 232,124,170 
 Sales 2,894,472  10,526,114  0 0 0 1,280,558  240,753,817  
Index 
 Purchase 7,510  128373 0 0 0 0 7,150,012  
 Sales 7,996  140,912  0 0 0 0 7,827,402  
Funds 
 Purchases 394,297  2,665,323  0 0 0 0 63,943,691  
 Sales 386,158  2,692,957  0 0 0 0 91,103,578  
Shares 
 Purchases 1,003,481  4,540,596  0 0 0 85,107  123,577,542  
 Sales 1,024,113  4,508,274  0 0 0 102,746  149,037,060  
Derivatives 
 Purchase 55,283 567,902 0 0 0 0 35,839,139 
 Sales 82,363 645,814 0 0 0 2,811 36,492,260 
N = 10,355 
Note: Observations contain a large number of non-purchase/sales. As a result, the median is 0 for all observations. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N = 10,355 Frequency Percentage Purchase Sales 
  % € € 
Fund category (CAT) 
Equity AKT – Equity fund 2,644 25.53 9,188,717,535 9,721,030,301 
Derivatives DERF – Derivative fund & DEVRK – Derivative 
fund* 
104 1.00 328,097,884 330,949,160 
Mixed GAUS – Mixed fund balanced 722 6.97 2,427,947,055 2,044,379,999 
GDYN – Mixed fund dynamic flexible 1,187 11.46 2,890,206,162 2,873,049,769 
GFLEX – Mixed fund flexible 360 3.48 1,027,089,682 981,726,503 
GKON – Mixed fund conservative 281 2.71 713,178,199 507,967,002 
Money MMF – Standard money market funds 74 0.71 115,103,699 132,527,927 
Bond RFLEX – Bond fund flexible (flexible duration) 2,612 25.22 14,888,278,248 14,568,616,515 
RLONG – Bond fund long (duration > 7 yrs) 71 0.69 452,315,678 940,981,821 
RMED – Bond fund medium (duration 3-7 yrs) 1,405 13.57 8,596,804,501 8,818,504,222 
RSHT – Bond fund short (duration 0-3 yrs) 895 8.64 4,698,338,998 4,591,551,696 
Gilt-edged (mündelsicher) (GE) 
 Yes 260 2.51 1,246,875,843 1,524,003,940 
 No 10,095 97.49 44,079,201,796 43,987,280,974 
Category of risk bond (RISK)   
Yes MINAA – AAA to AA  679 6.56 3,130,622,387 3,219,545,569 
INGR – Investment grade 3,346 32.31 19,829,373,126 19,383,030,519 
NINGR – Non-investment grade 365 3.52 1,521,287,098 1,861,967,325 
No NA 5,965 57.61 20,844,795,030 21,046,741,501 
Active style management (ACT) 
Yes BLEND – Blend 1,263 12.20 4,373,191,066 4,384,941,366 
GRWTH – Growth 234 2.26 381,746,783 547,594,255 
VALUE – Value 418 4.01 2,469,662,405 2,404,309,609 
No NA 8,440 81.51 38,066,618,798 38,174,439,684 
Passive style management (PASS) 
 Yes 97 0.94 153,713,555 81,266,871 
 No 10,258 99.06 45,172,364,081 45,430,018,043 
Notes: Data for 927 unique funds with 10,355 observations. Variables with zero outputs were not excluded from the analysis in order to 
ensure that appropriate comparison was carried out. Furthermore, we retain observations with n/a categories. This is a significant reason 
for this. The use of n/a could reflect instances where data entries genuinely cannot be included in other categories, but it could also reflect a 
“garbage” option for data inputters.  In both cases, then, it is highly probable that the information that is contained in the other categories is 
correct and any results of these variables provide results that can be relied upon not to have “garbage” data. 
We assume that all transactions are undertaken in the secondary market. 
*Categories have been grouped due to confidentiality. 
Table 4: Description Statistics for Grouped Data 
 
  
N = 10,355 Frequency Percentage Purchase Sales 
  % € € 
Fund category (CAT) 
Equity AKT – Equity fund 2,644 25.53 9,188,717,535 9,721,030,301 
Derivatives DERF – Derivative fund & DEVRK – 
Derivative fund* 
104 1.00 328,097,884 330,949,160 
Mixed GAUS – Mixed fund balanced 722 6.97 2,427,947,055 2,044,379,999 
GDYN – Mixed fund dynamic flexible 1,187 11.46 2,890,206,162 2,873,049,769 
GFLEX – Mixed fund flexible 360 3.48 1,027,089,682 981,726,503 
GKON – Mixed fund conservative 281 2.71 713,178,199 507,967,002 
Money MMF – Standard money market funds 74 0.71 115,103,699 132,527,927 
Bond RFLEX – Bond fund flexible (flexible 
duration) 
2,612 25.22 14,888,278,248 14,568,616,515 
RLONG – Bond fund long (duration > 7yrs) 71 0.69 452,315,678 940,981,821 
RMED – Bond fund medium (duration 3-
7yrs) 
1,405 13.57 8,596,804,501 8,818,504,222 
RSHT – Bond fund short (duration 0-3yrs) 895 8.64 4,698,338,998 4,591,551,696 
Risk (RR) 
Gilt-edged 
(mündelsicher) (GE) 
+  Category of Risk 
Bond (RISK) 
GE + MINAA, INGR,  NINGR 260        2.51       1,117,015,691 1,377,363,428.61 
Non-GE + MINAA 544    5.25       2,504,472,359 2,435,453,487 
Non-GE + INGR 3,278                31.66       19,336,131,349 18,789,759,172 
Non-GE + NINGR 365   3.52      1,521,287,098 1,861,967,325 
No classification 5,908       57.05     20,844,795,030 21,046,741,501 
Management Strategy (MGST) 
Active Style 
Management (ACT) 
+  Passive Style 
Management 
(PASS) 
BLEND, GRWTH, VALUE + No Passive 1,681             16.23       7,255,264,342 7,330,711,624 
No Active + Yes Passive 88               0.85  149,519,059 75,133,265 
No Active + No Passive 
 
8,586       82.92       37,917,099,739 38,099,306,419 
Notes: Data for 927 unique funds with 10,355 observations. 
Table 5: Description Statistics for Grouped Data – Fund Category (CAT) – Bond 
 
Table 6: Tax Wedge – No Cascading (Best Case Scenario) 
 
 Mean Std. 
deviation 
Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum 
TWPER1 8.117% 55.197 0% 0.143% 0.745% 2.823% 2,572% 
TWTNA 0.014% 0.033 0% 0.002% 0.006% 0.015% 1.550% 
N=10,355 
 
Table 7: Tax Wedge – With Cascading (Worst Case Scenario) 
 Mean Std. 
deviation 
Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum 
TWPER1 80.163% 548.590 0% 1.279% 7.212% 27.674% 25,723% 
TWTNA 0.140% 0.334 0% 0.016% 0.063% 0.152% 15.504% 
N=10,355 
 
 
 
 
  
N=4,983 Frequency Percentage Purchase Sales 
  % € € 
RFLEX – Bond fund flexible (flexible duration) 2,612 52.42 14,888,278,248 14,568,616,515 
RLONG – Bond fund long (duration > 7yrs)         71        1.42       452,315,678 940,981,821 
RMED – Bond fund medium (duration 3-7yrs) 1,405       28.20       8,596,804,50 8,818,504,222 
RSHT – Bond fund short (duration 0-3yrs) 895       17.96      4,698,338,998 4,591,551,696 
Notes: Based on data for bond funds only.  
Table 8: Summary of Non-Parametric Tests – Without Cascading 
 
 TWPER1 TWTNA 
 CAT chi-squared with ties 687.162  *** 213.898 ***  
 GE z-values 8.565*** 49.589 ***  
 RISK chi-squared with ties 112.132 *** 126.394 *** 
 ACT chi-squared with ties 177.586 *** 22.895 *** 
 PASS z-values -6.764 *** -4.967 *** 
 Notes:  Kruskal Wallis Test for CAT, RISK, ACT; Mann Whitney U Test for GE, PASS 
*** denotes p < 0.01%  
 
Table 9: Summary of Non-Parametric Tests – With Cascading 
 
 C1TWPER1 C3TWTNA 
 CAT chi-squared with ties 577.618 *** 213.898*** 
 GE z-values -2.867 *** -7.042*** 
 RISK chi-squared with ties 93.520 *** 126.394*** 
 ACT chi-squared with ties 158.293 *** 22.895*** 
 PASS z-values -6.533 *** -4.967*** 
 Notes:  Kruskal Wallis Test for CAT, RISK, ACT; Mann Whitney U Test for GE, PASS 
*** denotes p < 0.01%  
 
Table 10: Summary of Non-Parametric Tests – Grouping – Without Cascading 
 TWPER1 TWTNA 
 CATGRP chi-squared with ties 423.506 *** 118.268 *** 
 RR chi-squared with ties 122.774 *** 150.245 *** 
 MGTS chi-squared with ties 173.053 *** 26.236 *** 
 Notes:  Kruskal Wallis Test for CATGRP, RR, MGST 
*** denotes p < 0.01%  
 
  
Table 11: Summary of Non-Parametric Tests – Grouping – With Cascading 
 C1TWPER1 C3TWTNA 
 CATGRP chi-squared with ties 369.684 *** 118.268 *** 
 RR chi-squared with ties 102.773 *** 150.245 *** 
 MGTS chi-squared with ties 156.177 *** 26.236 *** 
 Notes:  Kruskal Wallis Test for CATGRP, RR, MGST 
*** denotes p < 0.01%  
 
  
Graph 1: Median Reduction of Performance by FTT – TWPER1 excl. Cascading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N=10,355 
 
 
 
  
Graph 2: Median Reduction of TNA by FTT – TWTNA excl. Cascading 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
N=10,355 
 
 
 
  
Graph 3: Grouped Categories – Median Reduction of Performance by FTT TWPER1 excl. 
Cascading 
 
 
 
 
N=10,355 
Note: Similar results are found for the worst-case scenario. 
 
  
Graph 4: Grouped Categories – Median Reduction of TWTNA excl. Cascading 
 
 
 
 
N=10,355 
Note: Similar results are found for the worst-case scenario. 
 
  
Graph 5: Grouped Categories – Fund Category – Median Reduction of TWPER1 and 
TWTNA excl. Money Market Funds and Cascading 
 
  
N=10,355 
Note: Similar results are found for the worst-case scenario. 
 
  
Graph 6: Grouped Categories – Fund Category – Median Reduction of TWPER1 and 
TWTNA excl. Bond Class and Cascading 
 
 
N=10,355 
Note: Similar results are found for the worst-case scenario. 
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